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Brietzke: Interpretations of Calabresi

INTERPRETATIONS OF CALABRESr
PAUL H. BRIETZKE

Judge Calabresi's Monsanto Lecture' prompts this brief reflection on his
superb integration of so many tort innovations under the rubric of "splitting
rules." As a graduate of the Wisconsin Law School, I am pleased to see this
jurisdiction's worthy doctrine of comparative negligence2 playing so large a role
in the splitting processes. I am certainly no expert in tort law, and this
Comment borrows its form from a narrative jurisprudence: 3 a legal narrative
like Judge Calabresi's, or even a law-related testimonial of life experiences, is
interpreted by a (would-be) jurisprude for his or her own purposes. Whether
the interpretation adds to an understanding of the narrative or of law in general,
is for the reader to judge, of course.
A backdrop to Judge Calabresi's narrative, which is necessary for my
purposes, is that we live in a liberal democracy, 4 rather than a welfare state or

* This article was based on an earlier version of Calabresi's New Directions in Tort Law,
now co-authored by Jeffrey 0. Cooper.
** Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law.
1. Guido Calabresi & Jeffrey 0. Cooper, New Directions in Tort Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REV.
859 (1996).
2. John J. Kircher, Wisconsin's Modified, Modified Comparative Negligence Law, Wis. BAR
BULL., Feb. 1996, at 18 (stating that the first general comparative negligence statute was enacted
in Wisconsin in 1931, and amended in 1971 and 1995). See Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 1, at
873.
3. See Richard Delgado, Storyiellingfor Oppositionistsand Others: A Pleafor Narrative, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2411 (1989) (and sources cited therein). Narrativity offers a powerful antidote to
a legal formalism. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
4. See Paul Brietzke, The "Seamy Underside" of ConstitutionalLaw, 8 LOY. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 1, 25-30, 44-46 (1985) [hereinafter Seamy]. In the United States, liberal democracywas
pushed to itsfurthest extremes. Id. at 44. A political stability was deemed so important yet so
difficult to achieve that it was purchased at the price of an extremely weak federal State. Id. This
amounted to a storing up of trouble for the future, a trouble which Reconstruction and the New Deal
only partially ameliorated. Id. A weak State made a broad judicial review necessary for dealing
with the many disputes that inevitably arose and, from Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How)
393 (1857) to the Court's "switch in time" in 1937, judicial review was used (sporadically) to keep
the federal State underdeveloped. Seamy, supra, at 44. The Constitution having thus become
solidified during this heyday of liberal democracy, subsequent re-interpretations have been tortuous
and conducive to intricate and arduous lawmaking processes. Id. at 44-45. A massive but very
narrow strengthening of the national security State occurred in response to the Cold War, but federal
and state-level States-and the formalism and proceduralism of our constitutional law-otherwise
remained too weak to undertake meaningful welfare functions, for individuals as opposed to
corporations. Id. at 45-46; see infra notes 5, 26. This leaves many Americans with the comforting
image of living in a liberal democracy. Seamy, supra, at 45.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1996

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 3 [1996], Art. 2

886

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

a social democracy properly defined.5 New Deal reforms, which seemed
radical to many at the time and to some today, now offer only modest measures
of "welfare" to compensate for debilitating injuries of various sorts. These
welfare measures seem particularly ungenerous when we compare them to the
measures offered by developed European (welfare or social democratic) states,
where tort recoveries are correspondingly lower. In any event, there is no legal
right to welfare measures in the United States; Goldberg v. Kelly 6 was a turning
point when our history failed to turn, toward a broad theory of legal and/or
political entitlement that is characteristic of social democracy or welfare statism.
Nevertheless and apart from Social Security, key New Deal reforms seem to be
safe politically-at least for the time being. But a relatively more generous
Great Society package of Medicare, Medicaid, and other species of "welfare"
is likely to be gutted soon, beyond recognition and meaningful legal challenge.
All of this is to say that debilitating injury will be adequately compensated, if
at all, by the tort systems of the various states-an assertion as true today as it
was at the founding of the Republic. Under the intense individualism that
captured, and largely still captures, American imaginations, there is no sharing
of the losses or gains from the things we get ourselves into, except as

5. See THE FONTANA DICTIONARY OF MODERN THOUGHT 579, 672-73 (Alan Bullock & Oliver
Stallybrasa eds., 1977) ("social democracy" entry by Leopold Labedz and "welfare state" entry by
Donald Watt); RAYMOND WILIuAMS, KEYwoRDS 281 (1976) ("welfare" entry); Seamy, supra note
4, at 50 (citations omitted):
"Social democracy" . . . refers to the constitutional goals of Western states dedicated to
a genuine socio-economic equalization through gradual reforms that retain as much of
liberal democracy as possible. A "welfare state". . . is a cradle-to-grave caring for the
public, even at the sacrifice of much individual choice. It describes the projected
outcome of the search for stability by [now largely former] communist-party states and
the constitutional path of those Western states where liberalism was never firmly rooted
or where there is a willingness to trade more of the tenets of liberalism for more of the
advantages of the strong state.
...[Slocial democracy tends to emphasize affluence while welfare statism prefers
communitarian values, and the particular policies of particular European governments
will reflect a "balance" or "tradeoff" between these goals that is impossible under weak
states in the U.S.
See also MICHAEL OAKEHOrr, MORAUTY AND POLITICS IN MODERN EUROPE: THE [1958]
HARVARD LECTURES 24 (Shirley Letwin ed., 1993) (there is a "morality of collectivism," which is
opposed to the "morality of individuality" and concerns those otherwise-alienated individuals who
lack the power to respond to opportunities and make a position for themselves).
6. 397 U.S. 254, 255 (1970) (holding that New York could not terminate public assistance
benefits without notice and an opportunity to be heard). The Court rejected a narrow proceduralism
and the conventional distinction between privileges and rights, and applied the broad entitlement
terminology of Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). See Goldberg, 397
U.S. at 262 n.8. Widely thought to be a radical innovation at the time, Goldberg quickly fell into
disuse by a Court which drifted in more conservative directions. The absence of a broad theory of
entitlement from our law arguably leaves disappointed people constantly claiming their specific
"entitlements" in a bewildering variety of circumstances.
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7
specifically provided for in the private law of tort, contract or property.

Against this backdrop, the "politics" of Judge Calabresi's narrative seem
momentous indeed: a vanguard of tort law is moving us, perhaps with "all
deliberate speed," s from a risk-bearing society to a risk-sharing society. 9 This
trend seems to contradict an individualistic, liberal democratic sense of
ourselves, by transforming state courts into rather limited welfare agencies
which lack a legislative mandate. Under the new splitting rules ably analyzed
by Judge Calabresi, these courts are forcing defendants to bear part of the costs
of an increasing number of injuries. Most of these costs used to be borne solely
by plaintiffs, who were barred from tbrt recoveries by the nineteenth-century
"liberal" doctrines of contributory negligence, a narrowly-conceived causation,
the last clear chance, assumption of risk, etc.'" Some co-defendants are even
forced to share this liability with each other, under doctrines of a "statistical
causation," rather than maintaining their "liberal" autonomy-and the potentially
greater responsibility that such an autonomy entails-under the older rules of a
joint and several liability."
An analogous narrative might be constructed for contracts law, out of
selective manipulations of the rules of offer and acceptance, the consideration
doctrine, the excuses for non-performance of a condition, a quasi-contractual
liability, etc. 2 When compared to Judge Calabresi's tort narrative, such a

7. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv.
1685, 1713-21 (1976). Some might argue that rules relating to racial or gender discrimination play
redistributive roles akin to those of a social democracy or welfare statism. See supra note 5. See
also JULIUS STONE, HUMAN LAW AND HUMAN JUSTICE 88 (1965) (stating that an extreme individual
free will was transplanted to the U.S. through the common law rights of Englishmen: freedom of
contract, property, and testamentary disposition, and no liability without fault).
8. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I1), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Justice Frankfurter's
imprecise remedial standard that is widely regarded as having slowed the pace of school
desegregation, an imprecision Frankfurter thought necessary to achieve unanimity on the Court).
The judicial tort reformers described by Judge Calabresi must sometimes feel a similar need to be
less than explicit and precise about what they are doing.
9. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
10. See generallyCalabresi & Cooper, supra note 1, at 869, 871-73, 875-78; William Ewald,
Comparative Jurisprudence(I): The Logic of Legal Transplants, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 489, 503
(1995) (stating that American legal analysis "concentrates, not on the routine cases that, in terms of
sheer quantity, make up the overwhelming bulk of cases . . . , but rather on the exceptional cases
that re-define the law.").
11. See generallyCalabresi & Cooper, supra note 1, at 881-83.
12. See, e.g., Davis v. Jacoby, 34 P.2d 1026 (Ca. 1934) (arguably manipulating the rules of
offer and acceptance, in ways which probably overcompensate the injuries suffered by friends who
abandoned their livelihood and traveled to manage finances and health care for the "half-crazy"
deceased); Angel v. Murray, 322 A.2d 630 (R.I. 1974) (relaxing the requirement of consideration
for the modification of a contract, where some additional compensation is "fair and equitable in the
circumstances"); Wortman v. Jessen, 159 N.W.2d 564 (Neb. 1968) (strict compliance with express
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contracts narrative would be much less coherent and explicitly directed toward
a splitting of liability. However, the function of splitting appears rather more
clearly through such relatively new contracts doctrines as the obligation to show
good faith, unconscionability, section 90 liability, unilateral mistake, an
expanded duty to disclose which operates to relax a caveat emptor, and the
impracticability of performance. 3 Ever in the avant-garde, California has even
come up with a comparative bad faith standard that neatly tracks the splitting
functions of comparative negligence. 4
Some of the ideas and policies
underlying these doctrines are very old, medieval even. They have been revived
only now to serve as counterweights to a nineteenth century (liberal, laissez
faire, winner-take-all) freedom of contract, under which you could keep
everything you can get by simply "bargaining" for it. Perhaps an even more
tenuous narrative could be created for property law, so that we can imagine a
slow but far from glacial shift occurring throughout private law.

conditions excused because seller got more or less what he bargained for, and buyer would otherwise
bear too great an injury); United States v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 479 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1973)
(holding that a subcontractor can recover on quantum meruit basis for part performance, even though
a breach of contract suit is not possible).
13. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Williams Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(consumer's liability limited to sums already paid under an unconscionable installment credit
contract); Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. 1971) (reallocating tort-style risks,
where the contract allocating them was unconscionable-presented on a "take it or leave it basis"
to a gas station owner of "poor education"); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267
(Wis. 1965) (reimbursing plaintiff, under Restatement of Contracts, § 90, for some but not all of
his injuries resulting from the collapse of franchise negotiations prior to an agreement); Elsinore
Union Elem. Sch. Dist. v. Kastorff, 353 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1960) (splitting the difference between a
contractor who made two unilateral mistakes and a landowner who made none); Stambovsky v.
Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (requiring seller to disclose that house is
apparently infested with poltergeists, by court's finding of an awkward "equitable" exception to
caveat emptor); Groseth Int'l v. Tenneco, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 159 (S.D. 1987) (discussing doctrines
of frustration and impracticability, and allowing a trial on, e.g., whether plaintiff is entitled to a
"fair share" of the proceeds from a merger which resulted in termination of the plaintiff's franchise);
CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 945 (Thomas Crandall & Douglas Whaley eds.,
2d ed. 1993):
Concepts of good faith, cooperation, and prevention are closely related.... [T]he
court may find a material breach of an implied promise (covenant): (a) not to prevent
the other party from performing; (b) to cooperate in ensuring performance is achieved;
or (c) to act in good faith .... The boundaries of the duty of good faith, etc., are
generally defined by the parties' intent and reasonable expectations .... See, e.g.,
Cross & Cross Properties, Ltd. v. Everett Allied Co., 886 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1989).
Id.
California has led other jurisdictions in granting remedies revolving around good faith. Id.
14. See California Casualty Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 218 Cal. Rptr. 817 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985);
Mary Ann Galante, Court OK's ComparativeBad Faith as a Defense, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 4, 1985,
at 10. But see Johnson v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., 533 N.W.2d 203 (Iowa 1995) (refusal to follow
this comparative bad faith standard).
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What accounts for these kinds of changes? Judge Calabresi concludes that
the splitting of liabilities in tort is based on "not merely fault, but a more
complex and hybrid concept we call 'responsibility.'"" This apt term could
also be used in contracts-as a supplement to the older "will" theory, which has
a court merely tease out the parties' intentions-and it reflects judgments about
where the judge and jury "would rather put the loss," regardless of fault on
occasion.' 6 While Judge Calabresi cannot go into much detail in his Lecture,
many or most of these judgments presumably aim to socialize7 the relevant
risks and the compensation for them. This process is frequently trivialized as
a search for the "deep pocket": the legal person best able to pay compensation,
at least in part, and especially when this person can lay part of the costs of
compensation off onto others in society. Insurance companies and large
corporations with a "market power" are favorite deep pockets because they can
pass on part of the costs of compensation in the form of higher insurance
premiums (or hidden exemptions from coverage) and higher product prices.
This does not mean that the ability to pay will soon become a crass
substitute for fault in tort or intention in contracts. Reality is more complex:
real people (usually "plaintiffs") are suffering real injuries which many cannot
bear in their entirety and alone, given the absence of meaningful welfare
agencies that would soften the blow. (Cases about scalding cups of McDonald's
coffee tell a very different, perhaps populist story about what we think of
corporations and how they behave.)" This is no "creeping socialism," in the
courts or the society from which jurors are drawn, and Judge Calabresi notes
that evidence about what is happening "is hard to quantify, hard to verify, and
hard to explain."'
I would add that much of this splitting occurred while
society was taking a significant political lurch to the Right, and while some or
many of the relevant judges were appointed or elected as part of a state-level
fallout from the Reagan Revolution. Presumably, none of us favor higher
insurance premiums or product prices, yet some or many judges and jurors, who
may inveigh against "welfare queens" in their private political capacity, will
nonetheless split the difference in favor of plaintiffs they see in their official
capacity.

15. Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 1, at 870.
16. Id. at 871. See id. at 877 ("splitting is not too far away in at least some situations where
neither side is at fault."); id. at 878 (in effect, this is "an expansion
...of ultrahazardous or products liability . . .").
17. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
18. *Astill-useful narrative about such attitudes is J. WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970 (1970).
19. Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 1, at 860 (discussing an alleged judicial retreat from "very
strongly pro-plaintiff positions to positions more favorable to business and other classes of
defendants").
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What seems to be going on speaks well of the humanistic and humane
sensibilities of judges and jurors. It is easy for individualistic Americans to
oppose welfare in the abstract; ideologies have been pre-packaged for this
purpose over the past two decades. But face-to-face encounters with the
concrete reality of suffering in its diverse forms, and the belief that judge and
jury are charged with fixing such problems somehow, sometimes cause ideology
to be pushed aside in favor of more charitable or even visceral responses.
Faced with so awkward a dilemma, we tend to split the difference. If law tries
to justify these responses after the fact, the rules will likely be only a little more
articulate and coherent than the responses themselves. 2' If we really believed
in the efficacy of President Bush's "thousand points of light," none of this
would be necessary.
The contributions of splitting to an overall "justice" are quite modest and
dependent on the accident of an injured person being willing and able to identify
one or more defendants capable of paying, and to then file a suit which elicits
some sympathetic response. Perhaps needless to say, not all plaintiffs are
competent, sympathetic, deserving, and poor; overcompensation is almost as
likely as undercompensation, while many receive no compensation at all. Courts
lack the funds and staff to deal with more than a fraction of the debilitating
injuries that occur. Judges and some jurors are surely aware of all of this, yet
the process seems to push on according to a relentless logic of its own. An
analogy to the vexed question of abortion2' is not too farfetched a means for
exploring this logic.
Judges certainly could have abstained-from Roe v. Wade' or the splitting
rules Judge Calabresi describes-until after the wheels of Congress or state
legislatures turned, in very slow but possibly more certain, comprehensive, and
democratically legitimate ways. (Such reforms might have resembled a workers'
compensation, with assertions of entitlements and responsibility rather than of
rights and fault.) However as John Maynard Keynes remarked, in the long run
we are all dead: including the victims of unwanted children, backstreet
abortionists, and other uncompensated injuries. Judges could not refrain from
acting because they saw too much remediable but unremediated pain "out

20. See Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 1, at 879, 880 (splitting rules make a "deeply seated"
joint and several liability "muddy and problematic"). Uncertainty always proliferates when judges
move in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion, in sub rosa ways because judges are not supposed to
"legislate."
21. See Paul Brietzke, Public Policy: Contract, Abortion, and the CIA, 18 VAL. U. L. REv.
741, 861-906 (1984) [hereinafter Policy],
22. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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which tend to disadvantage the poor.' Judge Calabresi suggests why this is so
for tort reforms: injured people are "usually absent from reform proposals in
legislatures" because they "are not repeat players" and tend to "lose interest
quickly" once their personal problems are resolved one way or another.' This
is bound to skew the legislative process badly, at least under a special interest
or "porkbarrel" model of politics.' In the face of such a political failure-the
failure of a legislative "market" to account for the interests of those most
directly affected-it is an arguably appropriate, and even a "democratic,"
judicial function actively to represent the interests of those who are
unrepresented or inadequately represented elsewhere in the political process:
people needing an abortion or a tort remedy, for example.
CONCLUSION

My interpretation of Judge Calabresi's narrative may well be overdrawn,
and it likely contains some or many elements the Judge would not accept. 27 It

23. See Brietzke, Policy, supra note 21, at 863-75 (Roe as "the Policy of the Second-Best").
See also infra note 28. Government cannot make people good; it can only require that they be just
to each other, on pain of redress or punishment. OAKESHOTr, supra note 5, at 67. New activities
create new opportunities for injury, and rules of conduct must be regularly updated to account for
this. Id. But see also Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 1, at 881 ("the courts do not seem to have
understood the full consequences of the shift from an all-or-nothing rule to a splitting rule"). The
same might be said of the awkward "trimester" system in Roe v. Wade.
24. Compare Policy, supra note 21, at 875-95 (Roe's "unwanted progeny" and the problems
faced by young and/or poor women) with Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 1, at 860-64.
25. Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 1 at 864.
26. Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1331, 1359
(1988) (citations omitted):
[Sipecial interest groups [repeat players like plaintiff's attorneys and defendants who are
regularly sued] frequently obtain government help . . . . These . . . groups are
relatively easy to organize because they are small and their members have much to gain
.... [T]he public [including everyone needing an abortion or a tort remedy] finds it
difficult to protect itself: members . . . have small, individual stakes in any piece of
legislation, and the large numbers of people affected makes organization difficult
[especially among the unorganized, and perhaps unorganizable, poor] . . . . Most
legislation, then, will really involve some rip-off of the public, even if it purports to
serve the public interest.
Id. Judge Calabresi's description of political processes is somewhat gentler and more polite. See
Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 1, at 860-68. By way of contrast, judges are repeat players,
listeners who acquire an expertise in risk allocation and compensation because the welfare agency
that would otherwise develop this expertise does not exist.
27. Perhaps my interpretation is the kind of "science fiction thinking" that Judge Calabresi
discusses. See, e.g., Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 1 at 878-79.
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It amounts to an application of the theory of second-bestp because the
"best"-adequate compensation for a variety of debilitating injuries-is not
attainable in America for a variety of ideological, political, and doctrinal
reasons. The awkwardness and imprecision of a second-best like splitting would
be disdained by the neoclassical (neoconservative or Chicago) school of law and
economics that exerts a significant influence on our judicial thinking. Bemused
by the rather austere elegance of their Coase Theorem,' Chicagoans would
likely follow Coase in requiring that law assign liability or non-liability clearly
and in its entirety, rather than splitting it, so that the parties can more readily
bargain out the consequences of their encounter. But Coase's key assumptions
that the law is clear and that transaction costs are zero' are frequently
forgotten during applications of his Theorem to the many real-world situations
where legal uncertainty and transaction costs are high in fact. In the high
transaction-cost situations Judge Calabresi describes, bargains between or among
the parties seldom transpire. The "externalities" (the consequences of injuries)
are thus seldom "internalized" (adequately compensated for), contrary to
Coase's Nobel Prize-winning prediction.
In so imperfect a real world, the splitting of liability may regularly offer
the least-worst solution, not only from the standpoint of compensation, but also
by offering incentives for everyone to be careful, and even by promoting a
relative legal certainty. 3 Judge Calabresi closes his Lecture by calling for "a

28. See Brietzke, Policy, supra note 21, at 863-75 (analyzing Roe v. Wade as a "second-best
policy" under the theory of the second best); id. at 875 n.423:
[P]ublic policy need not approximate the ideal results attainable under a favored theory,
where theoretical assumptions do not accurately describe the real world. The best e.g.
of a theory of the second best is the economics concept of a workable competition. See
J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 13-15, 464-67 (2d ed. 1968); J. KOCH,
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PRICES 53, 314, 322, 347 (1974); R. MILLER,
INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 445-56 (1978); F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 22-25 (1970) ....

29. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
30. Id. Coase does not define transaction costs and treats them ambiguously. See id. But there
is a growing consensus that they are basically costs of information. See Carl J. Dahlman, The
transaction costs
Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141 (1979). If all information is free (if
are zero), everything then becomes foreseeable because the requisite information is in place. Most
accidents will thus not occur, at least when the (greatly-reduced) costs of avoiding them are less than
the costs of compensating for their consequences. This is a wildly improbable, if wonderful world,
where investigation, negotiation, litigation, and other means of dealing with information are also
free.
31. See, e.g., Werner Z. Hirsch, Reducing Law's Uncertainty and Complexity, 21 UCLA L.
REV. 1233 (1974). Citing McKean, Hirsch argues for a risk-sharing in the real world: "If
producers are liable for failures and damages, then individuals may lack incentives to use the goods
properly [may succumb to a 'moral hazard'].... While, if buyers face all liability, then producers.
may not have the proper incentives." Id. at 1235. (Chicagoans would argue that competition with
other producers generates the "proper incentives," regardless of liability.) Hirsch then quotes
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lot more hard analysis and hard data" 32 about such matters, and by asking a
series of tough, relevant questions. The jury is obviously still out on these
questions but, in the meantime, Judge Calabresi offers us much food for
thought.

McKean:

[A]s with property rights assignments in general, different [including split] liability
assignments would often bring about significant differences in resource use because of
differential transaction costs. It is important to know more about the variation of
transaction costs under alternative institutions and about the implications for wealth
distribution and resource allocation of different right or liability assignments.
Id., quoting McKean, ProductsLiability: Implications of Some ChangingPropertyRights, 84 Q.J.
ECON. 611, 625-26 (1970); See Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 1, at 883. A splitting (sharing) of
liability and compensation must often have the effect of reducing the injured party's transaction
(litigation) costs, and thus of redistributing wealth in her favor-in the form of a smaller but more
certain compensation. By way of contrast, neoclassical (or Chicago School) economists favor a riskbearing (not a split-liability) regime based on insurance or a "self-insurance." But many cannot
afford to self-insure-to bear the injury unaided-or to buy insurance against rare and hard-to-predict
contingencies. Also, insurance is simply unavailable in the many circumstances where the
(transaction) costs of pooling the relevant risks exceed the benefits of doing so for a private
insurance company. These "market failures," of insurance or self-insurance not performing the
functions we want them to perform-compensating injuries adequately-arguably requires some
socializing of the risk and the attendant compensation. Such a policy precept echoes a Europeanstyle welfare economics (and perhaps a "Yale School" of law and economics), where attention is
paid to wealth distribution, as well as to an efficiency in the allocation of resources. See
OAKESHOrr, supra note 5, at 108-09 (welfare economics attempts a partial removal of wealth
distribution from the realm of individual choice, as did the French Revolution-"igaliti sans
mensange and igalit desfaits"); A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1932); HANS VAN
DEN DOEL, DEMOCRACY AND WELFARE ECONOMICS (1979).
32. Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 1, at 884.
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